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Christianity and Society

- A Lawyer Looks at Internal Security
and Constitutional Rights

SENATOR THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR.

- Desegregation and the Southern
Parish

WARREN CARR

- Conversation

- Editorials

- Book Reviews

CHRISTIANITY AND SOCIETY

A Quarterly devoted to Christianity and Social Reconstruction

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CHRISTIANITY *and* SOCIETY

EDITORIALS

Eisenhower and the Democrats

No one knows the precise consequence of President Eisenhower's illness. While wishing for the President's recovery, it may not be amiss to take a retrospective look at the Eisenhower phenomenon, which bids fair to become a unique chapter in American history. After three years even the Republicans seemed ready to concede that the country is Democratic and would probably elect a Democratic Congress, even if the presidency were again won by Eisenhower. And even the Democrats seem to concede that they wouldn't be able to defeat Eisenhower though ex-President Truman thought that the rigorous "give 'em hell" technic, which worked in 1948, might turn the trick again.

Of course both Democrats and Republicans may have been mistaken. Labor is united as never before and obviously not in Eisenhower's corner. Farm prices are continuing to drop and the farmers might have been completely off the reservation. The Eisenhower Administration has been at its Republican worst in its natural resources and public power policy and some capital might have been gotten from that. But on the whole there seems to be no way of challenging the "peace and prosperity" achievements of the Administration. This is particularly remarkable since the "peace" which has been achieved by a Republican president would have been condemned as "appeasement" if it had been won by Democrats who are still under the Republican indictment for being "soft on communism." The peace may turn sour before election. It will certainly not seem as promising as it does now when the world has experienced its first relief from the acute anxiety about atomic warfare through the Geneva conference. The Eisenhower luck might not have held, but it has been very phenomenal. To this "luck" Eisenhower contributed

not any great insights of statesmanship but an amiable public temper, a shrewd insight into the hopes and fears of the common people and a resolute determination to preserve most of the New Deal social legislation, despite the Republican fears of "creeping socialism." What strange and unpredictable events occur in our generation. None are more strange than the Eisenhower phenomenon. R. N.

Morals and Percentages

The greatest moral adventure in American life was initiated by the Supreme Court decision, declaring segregated schools unconstitutional. It was a great adventure because the mores of many communities were challenged by the ideals of our basic law and thereby was set in motion a long tussle between law and custom. Heretofore, when law and custom were at variance, custom usually won. But this time it appears that law will win a triumph in the end. Perhaps the reason is that it is not merely the Constitution but all that is best in our Christian and our democratic heritage which favors the final liquidation of what Gunnar Myrdal has called the "American Dilemma."

The progress of desegregation is uneven of course. States and counties vary in their compliance and defiance of the law. When analyzing this record it becomes significant that counties which comply are usually those which have a minority of 25 percent or less of Negroes. On the other hand, counties which approach the 50 percent ratio almost invariably seek some form of evasion. No one need be surprised at this phenomenon which shows the relation of moral ideals to mathematical facts. It is easier for a majority to be tolerant of a small than of a large minority. If the minority is large the tension between the two groups shows a corresponding increase. This

is a phenomenon of all group relations and does not apply solely to Negro-white relations. It may lead to pessimistic conclusions in regard to certain counties in the South. But it prompts to optimism when we consider the nation as a whole, where the Negroes are in an obvious minority. The relevance of percentages also suggests the sobering conclusion that the difference between us and South Africa is largely determined by the fact that the "minority" in South Africa is not a minority at all but a potential majority.

The relation of morals to percentage points is a reminder to all of us of the frailty of our conscience and limits of our tolerance.

R. N.

The Nationalism of Cyprus

Cyprus is a little island, once under the control of Turkey, with a Greek population and now one of the anchors of the British power in the Mediterranean. The people of Cyprus want self-determination. That is not unusual in a day in which all subject people are demanding liberty. What makes the situation in Cyprus unusual is that Britain is so reluctant to yield to the demands of the Cypriots and that the Greek Orthodox church under the leadership of Archbishop Markarios is the real bearer of Greek nationalism. There is a long historic cause for the latter phenomenon and a very immediate urgency for the former one. The church is the bearer of the Greek national sentiment because the people of Cyprus were for a long time under Turkish rule and, quite naturally, Christian traditions and patriotic sentiments became indistinguishable in that historic struggle. That is why the bishop of the Orthodox church is now the leader of the Greek national sentiment on the Island of Cyprus.

The second interesting aspect of the problem of Cyprus is the reluctance of Great Britain to yield to the nationalistic aspirations of the people of Cyprus. This is the same Britain which has made history by learning how to yield to national forces in her empire just in time, and thus transmuted an empire into a commonwealth of

nations. She yielded in India and finally yielded in Egypt. But it is precisely because she yielded in Egypt that she is so desperate about Cyprus. She cannot sacrifice the final anchor of her defense in the Middle East. The immediate urgencies of power in a world threatened by the Communist power makes it impossible to yield this final point. Of such ancient and immediate forces and urgencies are the politics of our modern world compounded.

R. N.

A Glimpse Into the Future

The Russian face now wears a smile rather than a scowl. The optimist believes this smile is a token of a bright future. It means at least that we are not moving with inexorable steps toward a war of mutual annihilation. Has not the Communist party boss, Khrushchev, admitted that both sides are now convinced that neither side wants war? The smile may mean only a change in tactics, and the Communists have been remarkably flexible in their tactics. All of us remember the Hitler-Stalin pact as the supreme mark of their flexibility. But the smile may mean something more. It may mean that the Communists are being forced to change not only their tactics but their strategy of absolute fanaticism as well. We are no longer "war-mongers." They have confessed that they do not believe that we desire war. When one regards this slight dissolution of the spirit of fanaticism which has been the main source of Communist power, one wonders what a few decades of "coexistence," even if not very peaceful, will work upon that fanaticism. May it not rob Communism of its source of demonic power and present us with a foe still dangerous, but whose dogmas are not likely to precipitate a suicidal war? The prospects for the future are so much better than any of us dared hope that the popularity of Eisenhower is quite understandable. If he was not the architect of Geneva, he is certainly entitled to the credit for the new "Geneva spirit" and for the brighter prospects before us.

But before we become too confident about the future we had better take another look

at present realities. The Russians smiled rather than frowned at Geneva, but they did not make any concessions on any important point. They assured the East Germans that they would not lightly agree to a unification of Germany, and that there is in fact little chance that the German problem or the whole problem of European security will be solved. They will agree to unification of Germany only at the price which neither the West nor the Germans are prepared to pay, as it would lead to a dismantling of the whole carefully and painfully developed western security system.

In short, these developments mean that we are free for a time from the dread prospect of imminent armed conflict and from fear that the ignorance of the fanatic priest-kings of this atheistic theocracy will plunge the world into war. But in its place we have the present reality of a foe who is more flexible and resourceful than the Stalinism which had hardened its orthodoxy into a rigid intransigence. We may expect decades of coexistence gradually to hollow out the dogmatism and to assuage the fanaticism of Communist politics. But it would be foolish to hope that the fanaticism will quickly dissolve. That is not the way historic movements, even when built upon illusions, disintegrate. Everything in nature and history requires more time than our impatience supposes. There is, in short, nothing in the new developments, however hopeful, which can free our generation of the trials and burdens of a long contest with the Communist power. There is nothing which will prevent this power from exploiting every weakness in the western defenses and particularly from exploiting the resentments of recently emancipated colonial peoples and the longings of those who are still not free. Communism is a false hope for the hopeless and a scourge of the Lord on every weakness of our civilization. That there should be such a scourge without any moral superiority to the civilization which is challenged is one of those mysteries of the historical process and of the providence of God which operates in it, which is beyond the canons of rational intelligibility through which we have tried to comprehend the strange drama

of human history. We cannot fully understand. We can only watch and be sober.

R. N.

Christian Action

Questions have frequently been raised about the appropriateness of the term "Christian Action" for the organization which has had such remarkable progress in uniting Christians of all denominations who are concerned with the social responsibilities of Christian people. Perhaps these questions are irrelevant because one does not lightly change the name of a child, particularly in early years. The name is the symbol of its identity, and even if parents have chosen an inappropriate name, it is usually felt that there is something irrevocable about the choice. Therefore, these lines are not meant to have any immediate application.

But for remote reference ought we not take seriously the questions of our secular friends who say they are embarrassed by the name because so many reactionary and sometimes anti-semitic organizations carry a similar one? The similarity in names between our organization and those which rather illicitly define their actions as Christian certainly points to the real difficulty of such a name. The difficulty is that we are organized to express Christian responsibility in the field of politics and economics. In that field it is particularly difficult to define any action as "Christian." It may be prompted by Christian motives and viewpoints, but it never overcomes the ambiguities in these realms and can, therefore, never be regarded as clearly right or clearly wrong. It is the action which we believe to be relevant at the moment in order to bear our Christian witness in the cause of justice.

Furthermore, even if the action is clearly in the cause of justice, it is not usually uniquely Christian in its application. "Christian Action" is not a political party or a conventical in the Catholic fashion. It knows that we are living in a mixed society in which we are frequently prompted to make common cause with people who are not Christian at all in opposition to some professed Christians. The very quality of

our approach to social issues therefore makes the name under which we function very misleading. For there is probably no Christian organization in America which is more aware of the fact that there are no absolutely clear witnesses of faith and love in the political sphere, though there may be highly significant testimonies; and that every cause of justice must marshal all kinds of people, Catholic, Protestant, and Jew, believers and unbelievers in its support. It is one of the glories of a true democracy that it allows one to choose one's bed-fellows from issue to issue. In one moment one is allied with Catholics on some important domestic issue. In the next moment one is allied with secularists of all kinds, including very polemical secularists, when the question is the spread of clerical pretensions, whether in Mexico or Spain.

The writer was not present when the name "Christian Action" was chosen, but he supposes that it was chosen with the haste and caprice which usually characterizes organizing conventions. They first agree upon a set of common principles and objectives, and then, when the hour has grown late, the inconvenient question of the name arises and is settled hurriedly and capriciously. But whatever the circumstances of the hour of baptism, it is significant that the name betrays viewpoints still widely held in our circles (that is the circles of socially responsible Christians), and which have been progressively dissolved in the history of our organization. Those viewpoints usually assumed that a collectivist economy was more Christian than "free enterprise" and that segregation was the wrong answer to the racial issue. On the racial issue we still have a rather unambiguous witness to bear. On the first issue we may reject all the pretensions of the "American way of life" with its glorification of "free enterprise" and yet not be as certain as we once were that the political control of economic life is an unalloyed good.

Even in foreign policy, where a Christian testimony must usually challenge the nationalistic tendencies in our country, it is not possible to have a clear Christian answer to the question whether the Russian "new

look" is promising or whether it makes the Russian threat more difficult to deal with.

In short, there is no field of human endeavor in which it is more dubious to define an action or the motive of an action as "Christian" than the field in which we seek humbly to guide the conscience of Christians. And there is none in which it would be more abortive for Christians to establish a separate and unique strategy. Everything depends upon finding like-minded people who are in agreement with our essential objectives, whatever their motives and however much they may diverge from us on other issues.

R. N.

An Invitation

Elsewhere in this issue "Conversation" makes its second appearance. Your editors are persuaded that such a feature can make a genuine contribution to the life of Christian Action. Its purpose is to provide an opportunity for the sharing of critical reflections on the articles which appear in *Christianity and Society*.

It is not giving away editorial secrets to confess that the inauguration of such a feature is not accomplished without a certain amount of pump-priming. However, its continuation would be less than worthwhile unless there is sufficient interest to make it self-supporting. Therefore, we extend this explicit invitation to our readers to react in writing to the ideas which find expression in our pages. Comments on articles in this number should preferably appear in the Winter issue, which means that they ought to be received no later than November 30th.

Since circumstances are such that the only contact which many of our members have with Christian Action is through our publications, the use of *Christianity and Society* for the exchange of views should be a fruitful way of enabling our organization to become more adequately a fellowship in which "conversation" does take place.

A. W. H.

The books advertised by Scribner's on the back cover will be of special interest to readers of Christianity and Society.

A Lawyer Looks at Internal Security and Constitutional Rights

SENATOR THOMAS C. HENNINGS, JR.

[This article was originally presented as an address by Senator Hennings to the Law Club of the city of Chicago on March 25, 1955, and was later inserted in the Congressional Record.]

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to you tonight—to submit for your consideration some legal and political questions in matters that are increasingly on my mind, and I know upon yours, as citizens and as lawyers.

For a long time now I have been troubled by the unmistakable fact that civil rights—which are the cornerstone of our national life—are under attack and in danger of abridgement. And I am sure the uneasiness I feel is not just the result of vague impressions. Unfortunately it is based on facts some of which I shall mention later on in the course of my remarks.

Yet, before I turn to the matter at hand, may I say, that I come before you in order to formulate questions rather than to offer conclusions. And I also come with a request that you, as distinguished members of the bar, should help our country find the answers that will preserve our civil liberties.

I believe we all agree that the erosion of civil rights, if true, is a paramount question of our political life and spells dangers of unforeseeable gravity. History, however, teaches us that civil rights are seldom lost solely by conscious deliberate action. More often than not the loss is, in great part, the result of an absent-minded, unconscious drift. When the citizens do not see the threat and when constituted legislative, executive, and judicial authorities do not realize the consequences of their acts, civil liberties are in danger of loss by default. As I see it, the trend that is now taking place in our country is just of this nature. There is, of course, no suggestion of repealing the Bill of Rights, but steadily, in unrealized stages, the rights guaranteed by the bill are

invaded and in danger of becoming nugatory.

The birth of our Nation was a momentous fact in the development of mankind. An entirely new state entered the community of nations. Economically, politically, and legally it had no precedent. Economically it was free of the restraining shackles of feudal economy—a land where property was held in free and common socage and where there was unhampered internal trade and freedom of occupation for its citizens, with equal opportunity for all. Politically and legally it was a country with a written constitution that embodied the experiences of a protracted fight against inherited privilege and tyranny. This Constitution happily united practical considerations with deep theoretical insights. The student of our past is impressed by its closeness to political and social realities of American life. At the same time, the sociologist and the legal scholar realize how closely it materialized the theoretical formulations of Montesquieu on the separation of powers. These, may I say, “Un-American” ideas born in old Europe became not only an integral part of our political life but found in our country their first, true and only application. How new and how revolutionary all this had been becomes particularly clear when, for the sake of comparison, we look at the other parts of the American and European Continents at that time.

The Constitution formulated by the Founding Fathers is philosophically a complex document. It is at once optimistic and trustful—and pessimistic, skeptical, and suspicious. It is a supreme expression of the mistrust in political power; it splits the governmental authority into its component executive, legislative, and judicial parts, and it enumerates its powers. On the other hand, it is an equally strong expression of a supreme trust in man as the source of cultural

and political activity—the spiritual substance of all life.

We often recall and frequently mention that our Constitution is based on the principle of checks and balances in government. I am impressed by the further thought, however, that the principle of checks and balances permeates not only the governmental structure of our country. I am afraid we often forget that the framers of the Constitution knew that this principle lies at the root of societal life itself. They have visualized our country as a social construct where the freedom of the people as a whole and that of the individual are balanced against the state and its coercive powers. Neither the people nor the state has the upper hand. This relationship, however, is not coincidental or artificial. It is founded on the recognition that man, in his rights and freedoms, is secure only within the framework of society—the state.

The creative activity of man prospers best in conditions of security and peace of mind. Any invasion of human rights has a deleterious effect on the cultural and economic success of human endeavor and is justified, of course, only when the exercise of individual rights, in its turn, invades the concurrent rights of others.

The trust in the free activity of man and the care of safeguarding it faces us in all the basic provisions of the Constitution. I have mentioned the splitting of governmental powers as a proof of this trust. The right to vote does not even require mention. More in point is the injunction against the passage of Bills of Attainder—the legislative means by which the English parliament used to punish dissidents without trial and under accusations having no basis in the criminal law of the land. Article 1, section 9, clause 3 of our Constitution enjoins the Federal legislature from passing such bills and article 1, section 10, clause 1 extends this injunction to State legislatures. It is clear from these injunctions that we have here a fundamental provision prefiguring the Bill of Rights.

In this connection I want to mention that the opponents of the first 10 amendments in

the first Congress based their opposition not on any objections to the rights to be secured but on the idea that these rights were already secured by the Constitution itself. But Jefferson and his followers carried the day and the Bill of Rights was adopted as an explicit statement of faith in individual freedom.

This faith, I dare say, never faltered. And the adoption of the 13th and 14th amendments was its forceful reaffirmation in the 19th century.

All these provisions, if observed, constitute a mighty bulwark which securely protects the individual against government interference as well as against invasions on the part of fellow citizens.

We know that legal propositions are not disjoined statements but constitute a contextual entity. Only within their context are they truly interpretable. Only by the token of this context do they find their proper place within the entire structure and exhibit their relative values. When from this point of view we look now at the Bill of Rights, I am inclined to believe that the first amendment stands out as the cornerstone of the entire protective edifice. It is this amendment which, in protecting the freedom of his thought, of his beliefs, and of his speech, secures man in the exercise of those gifts which distinguish him from animals.

The language of the first amendment is unequivocal and all-embracing. It is a truly revolutionary declaration that democracy as established by our Constitution is alien to the idea of orthodoxy as a test of human rights. Therefore, no matter how unorthodox or unpopular the opinions held by the individual, he must be protected from persecution both on the part of governmental agencies and on the part of other individuals. And that is why I believe that second in importance stands out the due process clause of the 5th and the 14th amendments.

These remarks, I hope, truthfully describe the nature of American democracy and represent views traditionally held. We discern them at the cradle of our Constitution. . . . And in this connection, permit me to quote to you from the Virginia Statute on Reli-

gious Freedom, written by Thomas Jefferson and regarded by him as his greatest achievement next to the Declaration of Independence.

The statute enunciates these propositions: "that the opinions of men are not the object of civil government, nor under its jurisdiction; that to suffer the civil magistrate to intrude his powers into the field of opinion and to restrain the profession or propagation of principles on supposition of their ill tendency is a dangerous fallacy . . . because he being of course judge of that tendency will make his opinions the rule of judgment and approve or condemn the sentiments of others only as they shall square with or differ from his own; that it is time enough for the rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into overt acts against peace and good order; and finally, that truth is great and will prevail if left to herself; that she is the proper and sufficient antagonist to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument and debate; errors ceasing to be dangerous when it is permitted freely to contradict them."

Now how does our 20th century practice square with our political-democratic tradition? Do we adhere to the precept that opinions and beliefs are within the sovereign domain of man as the builder of cultural values and that the State should intervene only when opinions and beliefs pass into procedures? Or do we say, "We have changed all that," as the fake doctor of Moliere did when it was pointed out to him that traditionally the heart is on the left and the liver on the right side, and not vice versa?

Certain facts make me doubtful as to the answer.

The Smith Act, for instance, makes it a crime to teach and advocate (please note these words)—no matter how abstractly and philosophically—any ideas of overthrowing the constituted Government by force and violence. The wording of the statute seems, on the face of it, to contradict the first amendment and I am not convinced that

the decision of the Supreme Court with its negative answer settles this question. *Dennis v. United States*, 341 U.S. 494). The decision was not unanimous and we know that dissenting opinions have in more than one instance become the law of the future.

It would be well for us to keep in mind the prophetic words of Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion in the Dennis case. He said: "Public opinion being what it now is, few will protest the conviction of these Communist petitioners. There is hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pressures, passions, and fears subside, this or some later court will restore the first amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong in a free society."

It would also be well for us to recall that Jefferson on his accession to the Presidency in the exercise of his Presidential powers pardoned all persons convicted under the Alien and Sedition Acts and thereby in effect invalidated these laws as they applied to those convicted. Jefferson, in a letter he wrote to Mrs. John Adams in 1804, explained the basis for his action in granting these wholesale pardons. In his letter he said: "I do not know who was the particular wretch alluded to, but I discharged every person under punishment or prosecution under the sedition law, because I considered, and now consider, that law to be a nullity, as absolute and as palatable as if Congress had ordered us to fall down and worship a golden image, and that it was as much my duty to arrest its execution in every stage, as it would have been to have rescued from the fiery furnace those who should have been cast into it for refusing to worship the image. It was, accordingly, done in every instance, without asking what the offenders had done, or against whom they had offended, but whether the pains they were suffering were inflicted under the pretended sedition law."

If Jefferson were alive today he would be a determined and bitter opponent of communism and the Communist Party and he would do all in his power to wipe out espionage and treason, whether practiced by domestic Communists or others. We may also be sure, however, that he would insist

on acting against Communists in conformity with the Bill of Rights and its historic principles.

In addition to the Smith Act we have the Internal Security Act of 1950 aimed at registering and branding Communists and members of various ill-defined organizations solely on the ground that the mere holding of certain ideas deprives such persons of first-class citizenship. I will be frank with you that this legislation aroused in me grave doubts as to its constitutional validity. I found it alarming that there should be a statute in the United States which would deprive individuals of their rights without due process of law, and limit, in such drastic manner, the right to hold opinions. For this reason, last year I voted to outlaw the Communist Party. Only in this way, some of us thought, could an abnormal situation be clarified, a situation in which we heretofore claimed that it was legal for people to hold Communist ideas and belong to the Communist Party and nevertheless forced such people to register, ostracized them, starved them economically, and yet refused to give them a trial in a court of law. I thought that if we do these things, we must do them honestly. If Communists are to be stripped of full citizenship, let us do so directly by a law making it illegal to be one. Then we can bring them to trial and they can test in the courts the constitutionality of our action. We owe this to our Constitution and to our democratic tradition.

The third example I would like to submit is the provision of the Taft-Hartley Act regarding the anti-Communist oath. In passing on its constitutionality, Justice Vinson, speaking for the majority of the Court, said: "The Government's interest here is not in preventing the dissemination of Communist doctrine or the holding of past beliefs because it is feared that unlawful action will result therefrom if free speech is practiced. Its interest is in protecting the free flow of commerce from what Congress considers to be substantial evils of conduct. Section 9 (h), the anti-Communist oath provision, does not interfere with speech because Congress fears the consequence of speech; it regulated harmful conduct which Congress

has determined is carried on by persons who may be identified by their political affiliations and beliefs."

I am not unaware that the commerce clause of the Constitution played an important part in the determinations of the Supreme Court. And I am far from criticizing this trend of our law. Yet we must not forget that the Court itself, speaking through some of its members, on occasions expressed doubts as to the desirability and interpretative fruitfulness of overworking the commerce clause. I refer to the forceful concurring opinions of Justices Douglas and Jackson in *Edwards v. California* (314 U.S. 160). This was a case dealing with a California statute restricting the entry of indigent citizens of other States into California. The majority of the Court invalidated the statute as a restriction of interstate commerce, while the minority, concurring in the result, strongly urged a decision on the basis of the immunities and privileges clause of the 14th amendment. Thus Justice Douglas said: "But I am of the opinion that the right of persons to move freely from State to State occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel, and coal across State lines."

I think the reference here to the relative constitutional depth of the two provisions is significant and should, I feel, never be lost sight of. Yet in this case there was no contradiction between the alternative grounds of the decision. In the quoted opinion of Justice Vinson, however, such a contradiction not only exists, but it is even explicitly admitted. Are we not justified then in insisting that the validity of the oath provision be tested in the light of the first amendment—the soul of the Bill of Rights? The right of Congress to legislate in a particular field can be justified on the basis of any applicable constitutional provision, but can Federal legislation be considered valid when its substance violates a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution?

Of course we know that all this raises difficult questions—perhaps questions which go to the very root of our entire cultural and political life. They are difficult not only

objectively but also subjectively. For my part I decidedly disagree with communism—its doctrines and its practices. I should say more: I abhor them. It requires a great effort on my part to discuss anti-Communist legislation in terms of the democratic philosophy to which we adhere by tradition and by conviction. But the inner ideological core of our Constitution is involved and the faith in that type of world which lies at its foundation.

For us Americans the Constitution of the United States is not a passing document. It is the embodiment of our existence. Like any embodiment it is inseparable from the things it embodies. Our adherence to its provisions is not a half-hearted acceptance. It is a belief, an unshakable belief, in its wisdom. Once it was a prophecy and our history has shown that it came true. For these reasons, I feel, it is the essence of our life's task to live up to the precepts of our Constitution. And even when we think of amending it, we must beware lest we destroy that pessimistic-optimistic spirit which I mentioned in the beginning. We should shun amendments that would impair this spirit. I am convinced for instance that the Bricker amendment would do just this.

The way of life that the Constitution helped to create made our country, in the words of our anthem, "the land of the free and the home of the brave." And you will understand that, considering the way I feel, it would be insufferable to me to think of defending our Constitution by unconstitutional or even constitutionally doubtful means.

Now, I fully realize the stresses and trials of the tense international situation where the issue of communism plays such an important part. I know the temptations and I understand how the faint-hearted feel, but our faith must be stronger than any doubts. And may we pray in the words of the Lord's Prayer: "Lead us not into temptation, but deliver us from evil." Let us remember that the Constitution is a living thing tested in the vicissitudes of history and let us not forget that doctrines come and go but that the Constitution is and must always be with us.

When I survey the program of our anti-

Communist legislation, I am not convinced that it is always in accord with the principles and beliefs just expressed. In part, I regret to say, it is the result of doubts in the soundness of our social organization and in part it must be ascribed to dullness of mind and preference for conformity where initiative is required.

Recently the papers reported that there was a question whether a piano tuner who invoked the fifth amendment in declining to answer whether he was a Communist should be licensed. As I understand it, he was finally given a license, but consider what the raising of such a question implies: Assuming that he was actually a Communist, how can the tuning of pianos by a Communist endanger our security? Is it not a clear case of persecution for holding unpopular views, a position inconsistent with the first amendment? This case, to be sure, was favorably resolved. But we know that similar cases arise constantly. Would you not say that we tread here on dangerous ground?

I pass now to the loyalty-security program as a whole, and shall begin with the statement of some general propositions. I think that the following persons cannot hold positions in government agencies:

1. A traitor.
2. A spy.
3. A person whose opinions would prevent him from following established policy relevant to his tasks.

Treason and espionage are crimes, and criminals are subject to trials and, if convicted, to punishment. A person, however, who holds an opinion which prevents him from fulfilling his duties is not a criminal but an inappropriate public servant. I suggest that the reason for his dismissal or non-employment is the lack of necessary qualifications. It seems that our difficulties with the loyalty-security program arise because we confuse these basically different situations and, also, because we disregard the cases where the opinions of an employee are irrelevant.

In stating these views, I do not close my eyes to the question of seditious conspiracy which must be considered when we deal with members of the Communist Party. I

suggest, however, that it is inconsistent with the principles of democracy to imply the knowledge of criminal conspiratorial aims or to decide these matters by means of administrative determination. As a confirmed Jeffersonian, I personally feel that, in general, the scope of administrative law should not be unduly enlarged. In this instance, however, my reluctance has still another reason. The questions of guilt arising from participation in a criminal conspiracy traditionally belong in the domain of criminal law and its procedures. It does not require elaboration that according to the system of our law a person charged with a criminal offense has the right to be tried and to be convicted or acquitted by the verdict of his peers. This principle is universal, and I entertain the gravest doubts that questions of guilt raised by the loyalty-security program are heinous crimes, and I do not think that persons whose very honor and economic existence is under threat can be deprived of a fair trial in the accepted Anglo-Saxon tradition.

In this question, I fully identify myself with the following words of Harry P. Cain, former Senator from Washington and now a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board:

"In other periods, we have abused the meaning of the Bill of Rights. We are so abusing some of its meaning today. This must not dishearten us because until the amendments have been repealed, and this prospect is not in sight, nor is it likely to be, men and women possessed of reason can prevail upon others to understand that the amendments constitute our American way of life, and with courage these same citizens can prevail upon authorities to live in accordance with every one of them.

"What I have just recited about the letter of the Bill of Rights means just this: Had you chosen recently between being indicted for a capital or infamous crime or being held to be a loyalty or security risk, there would have been no choice to make. From the indictment, you would have been found

guilty or acquitted; sentenced or released through language and methods everyone can understand. From the allegation that you were a loyalty or security risk, you might have long wallowed in the wilderness of despair and mental torment without determining what the charges were all about, or where they came from."

The idea of allowing one accused to face his accuser is indeed not new. In St. Paul's day the Romans observed this rule.

In chapter 25 of the Book of Acts, verses 12 to 16, we find the following passage:

"Festus laid Paul's case before the king, saying: There is a certain man left a prisoner by Felix, about whom, when I was at Jerusalem, the chief priests and elders of the Jews informed me, asking for sentence against him. To whom I answered that it is not the custom of the Romans to give up any man, before that the accused have the accusers face to face, and have had the opportunity to make his defense concerning the matter laid against him."

When I think of the Federal loyalty-security program, I cannot escape the conclusion that a still further confusion prevents us from reaching calm and judicious decisions. The same, I believe, applies to congressional investigations. We seem to confuse mere advocacy of ideals with propagation of ideas by coercion. If anybody doubts this let him read the memoranda from the FBI and the Army and Navy intelligence services which were submitted to President Truman's Temporary Commission on Employee Loyalty and which dictated the original loyalty program set up on the basis of the Commission's recommendations. Copious extracts from these memoranda have been published in Miss Eleanor Bontacou's recent book on the Federal loyalty-security program. These memoranda make amazing reading. They tell us that disloyal and subversive persons—they are never once defined—are dangerous for two reasons. They are dangerous, first, because they are potential spies. And they are also dangerous—and I quote—"because of the

propaganda they disseminate." The Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence tells us that—and I quote—"because it has its roots in humanitarian principles based on the rights of man, our democracy is particularly susceptible to subversive attack. It is easy to masquerade as protectors of civil liberties, or promoters of the interest of individuals whose level of economy is declared to be substandard. Making an emotional appeal for the down-trodden such groups loudly demand rights for particular groups, but usually fail to point out the corresponding duty which logically arises from any social contract."

A Jefferson would have regarded the rights of man as constituting the strongest foundation of our democracy, but here this is presented as its greatest weakness. A Lincoln would have said that you cannot fool the people very often, but here the people are pictured as greatly gullible, needing a policeman to keep the Communists from subverting them.

Now, I have tried to stress that, if we want to preserve democracy the fight for the integrity of our institutions must be carried on by means approved by the Constitution itself. Any abridgement of rights which it guarantees would defeat the very purpose of the fight. I have also pointed out that, in my view, we have gone far afield in stretching the limits of the permissible scope of action. At the same time, I indicated some of the political reasons for the present trends; I mentioned the emotional tensions of the cold war with Soviet Russia and the resulting fears lest our Nation be destroyed. It remains to point out some of the reasons which are anchored in home politics.

Indeed, I am troubled by the fact that when we speak of Communists, we are rather vague in stating what a Communist is. It is a matter of every-day occurrence that people of liberal views are called Communists. There is also evidence that such confusion is not limited to "neighborly" relations but tends to affect the Federal clearance procedures. In studying these attitudes, I feel that we have here a situation which threatens the integrity of our institutions and our way of life. As every other work

of human endeavor, our country is not perfect. Only a steady process of improvement can prevent society from decay or revolution. We believe that the best way to bring about beneficial changes is the democratic process established by the Constitution.

The essence of liberalism is a keen feeling for the necessity of change when the existing state of affairs exhibits social and economic injustice or traits of a lifeless and trammeling past. Liberalism, therefore, is a structural element of the democratic process. To suggest that liberals are traitors or to intimate this covertly, represents a direct danger to our society.

Of late, the fight against liberals has been carried out under the slogans of the fight against treason. This new slogan came to supplement the older pretext that the liberals in our country had advocated "un-American" ideas.

Representative Martin Dies, who was the principal proponent of the resolution creating the Committee on Un-American Activities and its first chairman, only last Monday (March 21, 1955) issued a statement strongly urging fair hearings for persons accused as security risks. He said: "I know the accused ought to be confronted with witnesses . . . he ought to have a bill of particulars in advance, and he ought to know the criteria for judging—the rules on what constitutes guilt." He stated further: "When the committee started in 1938, I warned in my opening statement that such a probe could go to excess. I pledged if it did, that I would take the lead in correcting it and defending innocent people. So I felt a moral obligation . . . I never wanted this to become an emotional, hysterical thing." Representative Dies indicated that he became alarmed concerning the Federal loyalty-security program in the process of representing a Federal employee, Dr. Edward Elliott, charged with disloyalty. This man, Representative Dies had cleared before the Un-American Activities Committee back in 1942. In regard to this case, Representative Dies said: "I believe that in back of this thing was violent opposition to Dr. Elliott's views. He had liberal ideas, but

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Desegregation and the Southern Parish

WARREN CARR

The church in the South is on the spot. The historic pronouncement by the Supreme Court that segregated education is illegal has placed the church in the present predicament. To conjecture that the church may well be the last citadel of segregation in the South is not unreasonable. Many people will feel that this fact speaks well for the church. To others, in all sections of the land, it indicates the church's deficiency in the Christian virtues. They interpret any such position as comparing unfavorably with contemporary secular institutions.

It is difficult to agree with either of the above views. In support of such disagreement, one has but to note that the church has always been suspicious of progress through legislation. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, kings and legislators were accepted only as necessary evils. Their introduction into the stream of Hebrew history was interpreted as a rejection of the theocratic rule of God. The church has never been a legal innovator. In this respect, she has always looked with serious scrutiny upon her own liberals. Even now in those sections of the country where segregation is legally outlawed, the church continues to be a segregated institution. It is therefore evident that the interpretation for desegregation by the Supreme Court will not in itself coerce the thinking of the church. She will continue to adhere to the historic position of looking askance at any such matters under the law.

This makes the role of the church even more important. To be deliberately unchristian as regards integration is not her purpose. Nor does she arrogantly look with a dim view at the law. She teaches her people to be good citizens and to obey the law. At the same time there is the realization that ultimate integration is a matter of the spirit. Nor will the spiritual achievement so necessary to real integration ever come apart from the church. Though integration will arrive with greater caution and deliberation

on the church's part, it will be eminently more vital and realistic. When the change comes, it will be based on true Christian conviction and will make for solidarity within the members of the Christian community.

Such was the experience of Paul. One so capable of firm conviction could also be stamped with a fixed prejudice. When he was transformed, it was complete and ultimate. It is not at all fanciful to anticipate the church's similar transformation in this regard.

The strategic witness of the church in this field, once made, will be most significant. This writer is a minister in a southern parish. Therefore, the subsequent remarks will deal with the southern church as to the present condition, the hopes of the future, and some strategy for the very real crisis.

Present Conditions in a Southern Parish

On Monday, May 30, 1955, the Supreme Court told the South the news. This had to do with the matter of ways, allotted time, and related matters germane to desegregating the southern public school system. The matter was left to local school authorities to proceed with a reasonable promptness in expediting desegregation. We were warned by the Court that prejudicial attitudes and personal opinions were no just cause for delay. Delay was only justifiable because of the functional and organizational difficulties to be encountered in any such sweeping transformation. The local courts were to be the jurisdictional center for interpreting whether or not school and community officials were guilty of using spurious methods of endless delay.

The press has recorded some of the more violent and instantaneous reactions to this verdict. I need not list them here. Actually,

they do not reflect the reaction most characteristic of the southern people. A continuing silence is the most baffling of all the responses, although the closer we are coming to decisive action, the less silence there is. To interpret this response is exceedingly difficult. There is a disarming quality to it that makes anyone hesitate to say what it means. The assumption that to talk about the matter is to give an affirmative response to the Court's decision seems to be the prevailing opinion. To say the least, the situation is not being talked through in any intelligent and calm manner.

There are other conditions more easily understood. One of the most apparent is that the leadership of the South is undergoing a radical change. Industrialization and the increasing invasion of the country by millions of tourists is a contributing factor. An unbelievable advance in education along with the growing economy has brought the South to the stage of constant fluctuation. In the overall picture the elder statesman of yesteryear is consciously losing his grip. He is doing so with a quiet dignity which obscures his real feelings about it.

Nowhere is this more evident than in the churches. The traditionalists who lived comfortably both intellectually and geographically within the Bible belt are being shocked to their very core. Consider the new trends of Biblical interpretation. Religious education is under constant change and intelligent scrutiny. Even the financial responsibility for the church is being taken from the hands of a few landowners and given to modern young businessmen. Then, too, the elder statesman is being forced to defend that theology which would seem to save his soul without concerning itself with the rights and status of the total community. Thus the conservatives are naturally suspicious of these newer and apparently more radical points of view. They are aware of their portent as to the shift in the balance of power. The rejection of the theological premise is an inevitable consequence.

This has caused a withdrawal by the old guard from the busier scene of the church. Though the elder statesmen continue to wield tremendous influence, they do so from

the shadows. They are neither seen nor heard at the pivotal issues of social conflict. This trend finds illustration in a recent event in our church. An interracial group of college students held a meeting concerning the desegregation of the public schools. A considerable amount of publicity accompanied their plans. The church and city knew about the meeting. With the exception of one threatening telephone call from an anonymous outsider, the meeting was not mentioned to me. Upon investigation, I discovered that the younger men of the church were not approached about it. The important point is that some of these younger leaders were not in sympathy with such a meeting being held in our church. However, only the older men were approached about it. This was done by the older people. So here was a circle of inquiry and answer, remote from the actual event, yet giving evidence of awareness and general concern.

This new and emergent group in the southern church is an interesting one. It is to be observed that they do not come from the North. The South is giving birth to her own progressives. There are two reasons. The new Southerner reveals some firm convictions concerning the Christian faith in relationship to a vital sense of community ethics. This is good and positive. It may well be wished that this were the only source of change. Of the other reason, one cannot be so sure. There is a definite reaction against the entrenched forces in the southern church. It seems that this reaction is for its own sake. It does not always stem from a true compassion for the oppressed. Telling the fathers that they have had their day appears to be a prime motive.

To come closer to the problem of the Negro and white man in the church raises the question of the barrier of fear. There are many furtive attempts at kindness and consideration by southern churchmen. Such efforts are usually attempted with a good deal of secrecy. The person who openly announces that he favors integration has reason to fear his own people. A man in a Virginia city has affiliated with an organization to perpetuate "white supremacy." In

a recent address, he said, "It would be better for us to rear ignorant children than to breed a mongrel race. The only difference between now and the Civil War is to be found in the changed attitude of the 'white preachers.' During the reconstruction period, they were on our side. They stood with us and prayed with us. Now they are for the 'nigger.' The greatest enemy that the white people now face in the South is the 'white preacher.'" The word "nigger" has not lost its explosive connotation among us. The word "nigger-lover" is far more explosive. If many of the southern people could speak without fear on this matter, the results would be consequential and astonishing. To do so is to chance a certain ostracism by their own kind.

Mention has been made of those younger leaders whose apparent progress in race relations really comes from their reaction against the elder statesmen. Some of these radicals are quite harmless and it is fun to watch them in action. Others are not harmless but cause real distress in educational, political and religious circles. For want of a better term we may call them our prejudiced radicals. At the meeting on desegregation already noted, one of these served as moderator. He presided over a panel of two. One was a white professor of law from the University of North Carolina. The other was a colored woman, a professor in education from North Carolina College. With no reasonable basis for doing so, the moderator threatened to stampede the meeting. He audibly wondered what the nation would do with its new secessionists in the South. After considerable harangue, this not so modest gentleman closed with the following illustration. He told us that he had occasionally appeared on several programs with a distinguished Negro minister and educator in the East. He pointed to the fine qualities of the man. With this, all who knew the man, were in agreement. When the moderator closed his remarks by saying, in a heated voice, "Were this man to come to Durham, many places would be closed to him which are frequented by white people who are not fit to black his shoes." Perhaps this is so. To say it in any such vindic-

tive manner is something else. It can do more harm than anything the Negro race might do.

One more matter needs comment in this survey of the South. It deals with a goodly number of earnest Christians who are nonetheless the product of the section's traditional prejudice. They are not represented by that small group which welcomes integration in school and church with unequivocal pleasure. There are some of these, but they do not represent the most hopeful signs of progress. Nor do these people reflect the prejudiced block which refuses even to look at the matter with intelligence or calm scrutiny. The group to which I refer hopes that it will never be confronted with the issue. Yet these people are sufficiently realistic to realize that such is an impossible wish. Far more important is their sense of the Christian ethic. Even though they would like to do so, they cannot bar a Negro from church or school because he is of a different color. These people are to be found in every church, and in most every segment of the South. Like it or not, they would be unable to refuse to accept a Negro into the church simply because of his race or ethnic group. Their Christian faith makes them uncomfortable in their prejudice. It does not allow them to give unrestrained expression to bigotry. No other group gives equal cause to hope that the problem will be solved with the greatest efficiency and a minimum of ill-will.

A Word About Prejudice

This paper would be incoherent if we did not look for a moment at the psychology of prejudice. To keep from going off on a tangent, any such study should confine itself to the southern prejudice toward the Negro.

It is needful to remember that the Southerner is now being asked to change a way of life. His prejudice may be deep or shallow. In either case his way of life is being threatened. For many of us, this is the single and sufficient motivation for reticence and even rebellion.

Add to this fact that most of us have grown up under a society with a static preju-

dice. In other words we have adopted attitudes which became ingrained in us before we ever knew the meaning of prejudice. We cannot evade this rigid attitude of most Southerners which has never before been seriously challenged, in school, court, or church. It is to be feared that some of our legislation does not take this into account. The South has operated on what the Supreme Court once said was the proper interpretation of the law. Namely, that schools which were equal though separate were within the law. Many areas of the South have conscientiously applied this principle. They have spent millions of dollars seeking to equalize the schools. Now suddenly they are faced with the ultimatum that such procedure is unconstitutional. This has undoubtedly been a "bombshell" to the southern people.

For a considerable time, it has been apparent that we need to concentrate on what prejudice does, not only to its object but those who are its subjective victims. It would be repetitious to relate here those stories of what prejudice has done to the Negro in the South. To ask what prejudice is doing to the white man who harbors it is a comparatively new inquiry. We can treat the matter only briefly.

First of all, we need to understand that prejudice seeks the most convenient object. It has great power of mobility and makes for unstable concepts in social relationships. When still a young man, I was severely scrutinized by one close to me because I seemed to lack a comparable prejudice toward the Negro which was one of his main obsessions. He later moved from our home in Kentucky to a city near Miami, Florida. Here he was thrown into the company of a great many Jews. It was both tragic and amusing to watch the subsequent transformation. Before he died, he had decided that the Negroes were really fine people. He had no use for the Jews. This need to find an object for one's inner frustrations is bound to confuse the individual. He constantly shifts from target to target until he is unable to attempt any real goals in the field of human relations.

Prejudice is the prelude to hate and not

the consequence. The South still "loves the Negro in his place." Some other sections ridicule this statement. It is nonetheless a true factor in the southern mind. So long as the lines are drawn and the separate groups respect such boundaries, there is no hate. It is only when one's prejudice is called by name, linked to a particular individual or ethnic group, that hate rears its ugly features. It is ironical but true that the prejudiced man begins to feel real hate only when he is called a bigot.

Finally prejudice blinds its subject. He is unable to evaluate his place in society and cannot interpret its consequences. The most prejudiced people I know in the South are the most firmly convinced that they are the most unprejudiced people. This is no cover up but an honest opinion. So strong is this conviction that many professing Christians cannot discuss the matter within any Christian context. One experiment went like this: A sociology professor was to address a church group concerning the matter of desegregation. He was advised that he should start within the framework of the Christian ethic. It was further agreed that he should not abandon this facet of the discussion until the matter had been thoroughly exploited. His schedule called for a series of three meetings each lasting for more than an hour. At the end of those three appearances, the discussion leader had been unable to get to the first level of discussing the problem even though those assembled were Christian. They dealt with legal, economic, social, and practical matters. Albeit unconsciously for the most part, the Christian emphasis was disallowed. Gordon Allport, in his book, *The Nature of Prejudice*, claims that the most important discovery about this subject is at this point. Prejudiced people simply have a different cognitive process and propensity from those people who are relatively free from prejudice. The church is making this discovery and finding that in the present issue it has two groups of persons who, though called by the name Christian, cannot think similarly because of the degree of prejudice which engages so great a portion of their number.

Dual Responsibility of the Local Church

So the local church must play a dual role and fulfill a dual responsibility in this present crisis. It must not tolerate discrimination, segregation, or attendant evils so far as its own pronouncement is concerned. It must be sensitive to the very real suffering produced in the lives of Negroes by the policy of segregation now in force. Nor can the church keep quiet on such an issue.

A colored college professor was driving her young son by a rather exclusive school in a southern city. She remarked to him as they passed by, "If I had enough money, I would send you to that school." The little boy replied, "Uh-huh, and if I were white!" Anyone with any sense of the Christian faith and its meaning is bound to feel real indignation over a social structure which makes this incident an every-day commonplace in the South.

However, the prophetic role is not to be accomplished at the expense of the priestly function and ministry of the church. It is not only ridiculous, but actually unethical, for the church and its ministry to alienate the white people by indiscriminate and irresponsible approaches to the South's greatest ethnic problem.

There is a frequent question which is going the rounds below the Mason-Dixon line. Not infrequently, a southern white churchman will ask a minister, "If you are such a wonderful friend and powerful advocate for the Negroes, why don't you try to become the pastor of a Negro church?" This question is not altogether facetious. It represents the deep foreboding resentment of the white churchmen.

Two answers immediately present themselves. First of all, there would be little prophetic opportunity in witnessing to Negroes that they should receive better treatment from their white brothers. In fact in a Negro church, it is quite needful even now that some preaching be presented to the effect that Negroes should hold their white friends in greater love and esteem. Amos was told that his prophecy was not too bad. The only trouble with Amos, ac-

cording to the high priest of his time, was the unfortunate location he chose as the scene of his prophetic ministry. Let the church and its pulpit stand in the midst of the worst prejudice and preach an unapologetic gospel. The greater the odds the more strategic is the prophetic ministry.

The second answer to the question posed is equally significant. That is that the people who are prejudiced need a ministry as well. To go elsewhere would be to forfeit this mission to them. Not only does the Negro need the power that lies in a prophetic pulpit which denounces the treatment accorded him in the South. The person responsible for that treatment stands in equal need for a ministry, which while prophetic, does not overlook the sickness that accompanies the malady of prejudice in the life of the individual.

Therefore, in summing up, it should be pointed out that integration must come with the greatest benefit and least damage to all people involved in the dilemma. This calls for a degree of practicality. To confuse this with compromise or expediency is foolish. When the practical has the ideal as its goal, it never sinks to the level of expedient compromise. This brings us to the point of strategy which will be discussed in the succeeding and final section.

Suggested Strategy

The points of strategy to be listed here will be given with little elaboration. For the most part they are self-explanatory. Many of them will seem very obvious. We need to remember that part of our contemporary social confusion stems from our reluctance to deal with the obvious. We have a propensity for the complicated and this is not good.

First of all, keep the Civil War out of the question. Many Southerners feel that their friends to the North have a "messianic complex" about the Negro question. It breeds resentment and does nothing to alleviate the problem. Having lived on the Mason-Dixon line, and to the North and the South of it, the writer knows that one does little good if he speaks with piety in one section of the country about another section of the

country. The most ardent proponent of integration in the South cannot help but experience resentment if another section of the country proposes to settle the problem for him.

We should be realistic and candid with the Negro. There is a tendency for some of us to become identified with the Negro group in this conflict. This is of real importance. To become so identified tends to label the individual. This is not the greatest danger. It also tends to reduce his effective witness to the Negro in the situation. Sufficient freedom from identification with any group is to be desired. By so doing the church, or the minister, is able to engage in a prophetic and priestly ministry to the Negroes. Negroes need to be reminded that the brotherhood expounded from pulpit and lecture stand is a reciprocal responsibility. They must do their share of the loving. So the Negro must be challenged to forgive and understand those who vent their prejudice upon him. This is the Christian message and we cannot overlook its importance.

Now let us look to specific techniques in a given parish. Initially, the minister must be a free man in a free pulpit. It is imperative that he respect the conflicting opinions of his congregation. He must sustain a consequent insistence of his right to his own opinion and the freedom to make such an opinion kindly articulate.

The minister, and church leaders, should avoid secret maneuvers. To do otherwise is to place the church in a position of hypocrisy. Whatever steps may be taken toward racial integration should be done with the democratic process of decision and approval by the entire church. Whether the church's polity is congregational or ecclesiastical, the minister should never place his members under the embarrassing duress of some secret moves. Any unilateral action on the minister's part is both stupid and unethical. To be sure, the clergyman, making such a mistake, does not always intend to be dishonest. Frequently he is seeking to avoid trouble. He hopes to get by some incident without the painful process of confronting the church membership with its prophetic

and practical complexities. This does not and should not work. It is better that the progress be slow and the steps shorter if achieved through the democratic process. In the long haul this has more benefit than the giant strides of a lone crusader. The confidence that one has in the minister who works in the full light of the church's awareness is indispensable to this total cause.

The minister should allow his members to save face. If the minister fights prejudice in his own personal structure, this should not be hidden from his members. Such revelation is far better than for the members to think that the minister faces no such battle. Whenever a change for the better is noted in any person, he should be congratulated. Often such an individual has been chided so much concerning his previous stand that he is tempted to revert to it. Whenever the congregation is poised to take a step forward, it should be allowed without a vindictive reminder that they were occupants of a shameful position in the past. Furthermore, the minister should let the people know that he understands and has sympathetic appreciation for the real battle that confronts any man who is trying to do something about his prejudice.

It is also wise to seek progress in specific events rather than establishing fixed policies. This needs some explanation. For example, if the minister proposes an interracial meeting in the church he should present the proposal as pertaining to that one meeting alone. The church should not feel that in granting this, it opens the doors for all future possibilities of like meetings. The congregation is not afraid of single steps as much as it fears the setting of rigid precedents. The method works both ways. To be refused in a given instance does not commit the church to a policy of blanket refusal in the face of all such requests. An added advantage in this strategy is that the matter is kept consistently before the church. Thus the total problem does not get lost in the obscurity of a few token gestures.

Again, the problem of integration should never become out of balance with the

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CONVERSATION: COMMENT ON PREVIOUS ARTICLES

Readers are invited to submit comments on articles for publication in this department. To appear in the next issue of Christianity and Society contributions should be received no later than November 30th.

Ethics and Policy Making

I appreciated Robert Gessert's report on the plans and prospects for the Institute of Ethics and Politics in the last issue of *Christianity and Society*. His article provides an excellent description of a significant experiment seeking to relate the insights of theology and ethics to the practical decisions of public policy makers. However, without wishing to be too critical of the article or the Institute, this reader would like to raise three questions to stimulate further "conversation."

1. One of the aims of the Institute is to give training to future policy makers. I am wondering who the policy makers are. Who actually makes the decisions which affect the lives and destinies of others? When I hear news commentators report that "the White House says . . ." I often ask, does this decision stem from Ike, Sherman Adams, the cabinet, Leonard Hall, or James Hagerty? A further illustration of this can be seen in the nature of large-scale organizations which are so predominate in our contractual society. The bureaucratic and impersonal patterns of specialization, complicated divisions of labor, and other complexities do not always allow one easily to analyze how decisions are made in these organizations. In a small business enterprise, the worker takes his orders directly from the proprietor. In a large assembly plant, however, do orders come from the board of directors, the stockholders, the president of the company, the managers and junior executives, the foremen, the union, or from the small intimate group of workers which contrives to set its own pace? It is too often assumed that policy is made from the top down, and the influence of the "bottom

man" in the hierarchical structure is often overlooked.

2. What is the relationship between *making* policy decisions and *carrying* them out? It may well be that the bulk of the participants in the Institute's training program, the young students preparing for careers in public affairs, will not become the "public policy makers" in their immediate futures, but will be more primarily the executors of policy. This is not to say it is unimportant to bring ethical and theological insights to bear on the acts of carrying out policy, but this is to point out that there are only limited opportunities within executive positions by their very nature to make independent, creative judgments which are informed by ethical considerations.

3. Is the "gap" between ethics and concrete decisions merely a "provisional failure of communication between those who analyze society theologically and those who make decisions" (p. 7)? Such an assumption seems overly optimistic to this reader for at least three reasons: a. It implies that the chasm between ethics and policy decisions can be bridged given sufficient knowledge of facts, including ethical facts; but is it not true that knowledge does not always eventuate in corresponding action? In view of the multiplicity of conflicting values usually present in public policy issues, even clearing the channels of communication between the theologian and the "policy maker" does not assure the closing of the gap. b. It is possible to observe persons who have had training and experience in both theology and the policy sciences, yet in whom the twain never meet. (It also occurs to me that those who establish and sustain the church's liberal policies concerning race integration—the professors, clergymen and scholars—nearly always reside "in the hills" or "on the heights" far from minority groups; and they usually send their children to private nurseries and schools.) c. Moreover, this gap which exists but points up the perennial problem of the persistence of sin; the "good

that I would, but do not. . . .”

In discussing the gap between ethical insights and public policy decisions it is appropriate to consider Pareto's classic distinction between “combination of instincts” and “persistence of aggregates.” The latter concept describes a type of action in which ideal ends are predominant, subordinating individual and immediate interests to them. The former type of action is that of absorption in immediate, personal, and tangible interests. Pareto conceived of the alternate predominance in governing groups of these two “classes of residues.” He depicted contemporary society as an extreme form of the predominance of the combination of instincts.

Even if Pareto's analysis were partially true, it points to the very real importance of the program of the Institute. While it seems almost impossible to expect public policy makers dealing with large and complex issues to bring professional standards and ideals to bear on their immediate tasks, when responsible individuals find it so difficult, nevertheless, this is the crucial task to which the Institute calls its trainees.

ROBERT LEE
New York, New York

Caricature of Christian Action

Through a metaphor in which he compared Christian Action's confrontation of the problems of society to the needs of people finding their way through a dense jungle, Edward L. Long has raised an issue extremely pertinent to the future course of our fellowship. (*Christianity and Society*, Autumn 1954.) He pointed out that our literature has been most explicit about the need for an axe to cut through underbrush and ward off lions—a need which the optimism of a bygone day too frequently ignored. But, he suggested, we have not been sufficiently clear about the need for a map and a sense of direction. He commented that “the ‘neo-orthodox’ thinkers apparently inherited from the social gospel an element of idealism and a sense of the demands of love which we have not in turn inherited from them.”

Although months have passed since Dr. Long's article appeared, I wish to pursue his thesis further. To employ a different metaphor—even a caricature—Christian Action might be compared to a society of people who dwell on the Plain of Practicality. In the distance they are able to see the awe-inspiring Mount Agape, whose peak shatters the clouds and disappears into the mysterious beyond. Between the Plain and the Mount is a rugged No-Man's Land inhabited by scattered bands of mirage-bitten nomads whom the people of the Plain call Puritans, Moralists, Idealists, Utopians, and other things, depending on the nature of the latest border incident.

Those who venture out from the Plain into No-Man's Land in search of mediation with Mount Agape are deemed idolatrous deserters. The crime of the idolater is that he becomes so involved in scaling the foothills in No-Man's Land that he permits them, rather than Agape, to fill his vision. Meanwhile, the people of the Plain maintain only telescopic contact with the mountains, becoming more and more impressed with the inaccessibility of its glorious heights. When it appears completely inaccessible, it is said to be “wholly other.” Concomitantly, the voice of the Plain becomes more and more accommodating to the accessible land of Practicality. When it is deemed completely accessible, it is said to be “wholly expedient.”

This process is reflected among the people of the Plain in an interesting difference between Age and Youth. Age, the backbone of this society, includes those who, before the constitution of the Plain was petrified, were free to wander out into the wilderness of No-Man's Land. It is recorded that the boldest of them fared forth in the blazing sun without their shirts on, retired rather scorched, and underwent an agonizing recovery. Anxious to preserve the fair skin of the next generation, Age solemnly abjured Youth absolutely *never* to set foot in No-Man's Land. Youth, therefore, consists of those who have never shown any inclination to wander into the wilderness.

Now—abandoning the metaphor—the trouble is this: Youth, educated by Age, is

well prepared negatively but poorly prepared positively (much more poorly than Age) to meet current social and political problems. Because *all* ideals have fallen under the pall of Age's polemic against *absolute* ideals, Youth is effectively cut off from positive mediating ideals. Age, however, still has, consciously or unconsciously, certain *forms* in mind which provide direction in making temporal decisions—forms which perform an indispensable function, even though they may be merely the shadows cast in memory by the ideals Age once seriously embraced.

The purely transcendental and the purely practical, taken alone, are too amorphous to provide constructive direction to our social life. They fail to include the third dimension: the dimension of meaningful time. We are not merely creatures of the moment with dim intimations of eternity; we are also creature-creators of meaningful history. As participators in history, personal and corporate, we must be prepared, insofar as it is in us, to give, willingly, thoughtfully, and prayerfully, *determinate form* to history.

We have concentrated much and rightly on the temptation to make every determinate historic form into a form of eternity. But it appears that we wish to circumvent the challenge of this prophetic insight by eschewing determination of form altogether. Obsessed by our finiteness, we have claustrophobia and, like gods, would like to keep all possibilities open. Perhaps our respect for Anglo-Saxon "muddling through" contains overtones of longing for indeterminacy, for in "muddling" we need not commit ourselves to any particular determinate form. But this means that determinateness will by default be provided or imposed wholly from without—by the "drift" of things or by those who, with or without idolatry, have the courage not only to be, but to be "something."

Do we not, as a group, lack determinate standards of personal ethics? Sometimes it seems that our only challenge in this sphere is the negative one of avoiding the taking of finite standards for eternal ones. Is, perhaps, the only contribution of contemporary

Protestantism to positive personal ethics to remain the permissive use of contraceptives? Do we want our sons and daughters to face the world without positive moral predispositions and concrete moral habits? Do we want the young people of our churches to meet every personal ethical challenge as a *wholly unique* problem, to be decided within the concrete moment and context alone?

While the positive ethics of the future is being shaped by expressly secular forces, it would be a sad plight if *all* we could do was to beat our breasts and say: "Lord, Lord, save us from idolatry." It would surely add to the irony of our history if in a period when the norms of family life are disintegrating our only word was: "Fall not into the sins of prudery and puritanism"; if in a period when the bare existence of mankind is threatened by nationalism and war, our wittiest shafts were reserved to impale the illusions of world government and pacifism; if in a period when the people are bewildered and confused, wandering like sheep without a shepherd, the best we could offer was to debunk all those attempting to give some kind of determinate content to our historical anticipations and strivings. The time is perhaps ripe to consider not only the truth of our truths, but also the ethics of our ethics: whether in expressing *one* prophetic insight loudly, to the *relative* disregard to other matters, we have not been guilty of irresponsibility with respect to the wholeness of our ethical situation as teachers of an ethics of responsibility.

It may be objected that these observations do not do justice to the intellectual leadership of Christian Action. But I began with the admission that this is a caricature. However, to the coming generation our movement will be a symbol with a limited number of connotations; it will also be in some sense a caricature of what was intended as Christian Action issued from its living context. The above is simply a prophecy of what that caricature may be. If it is false prophecy, let the saints be praised! If it is true prophecy, let us sinners get to work, and make it false!

LAWRENCE READ
Elmsdale, Nova Scotia

REVIEWS

A Drama of Ideal Types

The Self and the Dramas of History, by Reinhold Niebuhr; Charles Scribner's Sons, New York; 1955; 246 pp.; \$3.75.

Reinhold Niebuhr's writing of this book bespeaks a rare courage. The book was written, as he says euphemistically, "in two years of enforced leisure." In the teeth of a long illness he has characteristically made his "leisure" partake of the quality of drama.

Considered as a work on the dramas of human existence, the book in certain ways reminds one of the Augustinian vision of life.

Like Augustine, Niebuhr elucidates the three-fold dialogue of the self with itself, with others, and with God. These dialogues, he says, issue in the drama of action, individual and social. With his customary brilliance in paradox and with a wide-ranging command of historical illustration he interprets the three dialogues psychologically, sociologically, and theologically—though, definitely, not ontologically. At the psychological level he views the self as more than a repository of sensation, more than reason, more than a tool of instinct. At the sociological level he sees it as more than a nexus of social conditioning; it is both "the creator and the creature of every historical situation." Accordingly, the self is a unique, total, fatefully responsible person aware of its transcendence over and its involvement in body, mind, and conscience as well as nature and society. The theological orientation for this view is a Christian frame of meaning that rests upon faith in the Christ of the Cross which holds every creature under judgment and which mediates the forgiveness and love of a personal God that transcends every rational coherence.

As Niebuhr's readers would expect, his elaborated account of the self and its dramas is itself dramatic: in his exposition and evaluation of rival conceptions he spells out a drama of ideal types. On this plane of analysis the principal *dramatis personae* are Hebraism and Hellenism. Other related typological constructions also come into play.

Mysticism, aceticism, rationalism, naturalism, sociologism, liberalism, utopianism are all seen to be truncated or falsely oriented. It is not surprising if Niebuhr's polemical interest causes him at times to "rig" the types.

In the Hellenic view, the self is identified with its mind, the historical drama is understood in terms of the unchanging structures of nature, God is equated with universal reason. "The world, the self, and God all contained within the continuities of 'reason,'" as are also the fixed statuses of men in society. Reason is the source of virtue. Although Hellenism rightly stresses the need for rational discrimination, although it has aided in the understanding and the "conquest" of nature, and although since the Renaissance it has also quickened our "sense of the developing historical opportunities and obligations," it is "defective in understanding the self and its dramas because it has tried to understand them rationally and ontologically." Niebuhr's conceptions of "reason" would require a special discussion. But here one may ask, How are *psyche*, *eros*, and *pneuma* to be properly accounted for in this construction of Hellenism? How also the uniqueness and especially the inwardness of the individual self as articulated by Neo-Platonism?

In the Hebraic view, the self is not related to God by sharing its reason with Him; rather, it stands in "a certain degree of existential discontinuity" with God. At the same time, the self is inextricably and even essentially bound up with the body; witness the doctrine of creation and the belief in the resurrection of the body. Hebraism is eminently dramatic in outlook (though the Greeks knew drama, too). Both the individual and the community are "related to God in repentance, faith, and commitment." Holding stubbornly to belief in a righteous, personal God (not merely Being), Hebraism places man in a covenanted community based on unique historical revelations and commitments rather than on "eternal" structures. It is precisely because of this covenant that God hath a dramatic controversy with his people. But Hebraism

has a flaw: it subsumes nature under history, and "it is defective in analyzing any permanent structures in the flow of temporal events." Many of the vagaries of modern religion and culture are interpreted as variants of ingredients in these two outlooks. For an adequate vision of life, Niebuhr says, the truths (even those in the errors) of Hellenism and Hebraism should be maintained in dialectical tension. Here the liberal in Niebuhr shows through.

In the entire book little reference is made to contemporary theologians. Tillich, for example, is not mentioned explicitly, though Niebuhr's critique of ontology is directed at him as well as at Thomism. This issue—the dramatic-historical *versus* the ontological, as Niebuhr puts it—promises to become more acute as readers of both men take sides. In placing exclusive emphasis upon the dramatic-historical Niebuhr can scarcely sustain his claim to be Biblical. It is characteristic of the Bible to speak of ontological powers—the God "who laid the foundations of the earth," chaos, the serpent, the beast, the demon-angels (Rom. 8, Gal. 4). Creation, fall and redemption are cosmic as well as historical. Ontology is both Hebraic and Hellenic (and it need not be rationalistic or deterministic, as Niebuhr fears). Probably Niebuhr will not deny the ontological dimensions of Biblical thought. But then he will go on to indicate preference for mythological, dramatic descriptions out of fear that ontological formulations will obscure the "mystery" of the historical-dramatic. At this point one encounters a curious inconsistency in Niebuhr. He speaks repeatedly of the necessity for ("Hellenic") rational discrimination; he seems to criticize Luther for his scornful attitude toward philosophy (an attitude resulting, he says, in obscurantism); he also criticizes Barth's "frantic effort to isolate the Christian faith from the allegedly debilitating effects of philosophical and scientific speculations." But is not Niebuhr's exclusive preference for Biblical mythological characterizations of ontological powers (and the aversion to philosophical analysis) tantamount to obscurantism and to the isolation of the Christian faith from the philosophical disciplines? And is

this not a relaxing of the "rational discrimination" he extols? Does it not represent what Whitehead calls "an arbitrary halt at a particular set of abstractions"?

Yet, one of the most striking and valuable features of this book is the author's highly cogent critique of one after another of the pseudo-sacred abstractions that ignore or obscure the inescapable conditions of existence. For this reason as well as by virtue of the positive and critical presentation of viable components of Protestantism and of Western culture the book will stand high in that notable corpus of writings through which Niebuhr has increased both the stature and the prophetic relevance of American theology.

JAMES LUTHER ADAMS

God . . .

Man's Knowledge of God, by William J. Wolf; Doubleday & Co., New York; 1955; Christian Faith Series, Reinhold Niebuhr, consulting editor; 189 pp.; \$2.95.

This is a short, readable account of Christian theology, focused on a presentation of the Christian understanding of God. Although this volume will be of general interest to professional students of theology, it is addressed primarily to the intelligent general reader who is seriously concerned about religious problems. An assessment of the book's communicability to a lay audience is somewhat difficult to make because of the variety of factors involved. The style is clear and straightforward. The presentation marches. The discussion is quite uncomplicated and non-technical. Yet it is competently handled. Its relatively brief chapters do not presuppose too much previous detailed understanding of Christian theology and faith. Many readers will find the discussion clarifying and helpful. Whether most of the audience will find the theological outlook of the book convincing is a question whose answer depends at least in part on how one estimates the appeal of a contemporary explication of an essentially traditional and Protestant standpoint.

The content can be briefly but inadequately outlined. Christians find their

knowledge of God in the life, death, resurrection, glorification, and return of Jesus Christ. Contemporary western people who think they can find God in nature or in history or in moral, aesthetic, or religious experiences really presuppose a Christian cultural conditioning. Experiences in these several areas may point to the fact of God's existence, but they do not provide constitutive knowledge about who God is. This latter type of knowledge has been derived from the Christian experience of God within the historical community of faith, the church. This experience is grounded in the biblical conviction that God has disclosed himself in the history of a particular people. In a series of mighty acts within that history, illustrating both continuity and discontinuity, God has made his character and will fully known, culminating in the final and decisive revelation of himself in Jesus Christ.

God is not simply history, and history in itself is not revelation. History is the locus of God's meeting with man, and this encounter is revelation. History, in order to be understood as revelatory of God, must be interpreted with the eyes and mind of faith. The Old Testament experience, faltering and ambiguous as it was, and climaxed by the suffering servant insight, is preparation for the incarnation as interpreted in the New Testament. Jesus Christ is both God and man. The love of God is now seen as sacrificial love, bestowed indiscriminately on all who will accept it. Jesus is the human embodiment of this divine love. He is what he does and does what he is. The finality of the incarnation is vouchsafed by Jesus' self-sacrifice and his continuous unity with God.

In the cross Jesus conquered sin and the forces of darkness, although the victory was hidden from the disciples until they in faith experienced the resurrection appearances. In the ascension the "particularism of the final revelation passes into a universalism." The eternal Christ became available to men of faith in all times and places. With the coming and democratization of the Holy Spirit, the disciples were transformed and empowered and the church was established. Through the resurrection a point of transi-

tion was obtained "from the body of flesh to the Church as the body of Christ." God himself, in the form of the Holy Spirit, points to the risen and ascended Christ as he works to widen and deepen that community of love and faith which is his church. In this fellowship the Christian experiences his Lord and awaits his second coming.

Space permits only the briefest mention of two critical comments. I must omit a discussion of Wolf's implied philosophical position and his treatment of the relation between God as revealed in Christ and God as known in the depths of self-consciousness. First, Wolf, along with other theologians, takes a too abstract view of nature. In one sense, nature must be interpreted through the eyes of history and subsumed under it. Yet nature is more humanizing and more sustaining in the personal sense than many theologians are aware. Their understanding of nature is too external and intellectualistic and too often mediated simply through the sciences and vacation trips. They do not really live sufficiently in nature to know her subtle beneficence and providence. Also, the so-called bestiality of nature is open to sober examination.

Secondly, in keeping with the principle of continuity and discontinuity, the doctrine of the incarnation could be interpreted as a somewhat confusing and gratuitous notion. Granted that the revelation of God in Christ was decisive and final (in Wolf's and Tillich's sense). The continuity and discontinuity between Jesus and the Old Testament prophets are to be understood, according to Wolf, in terms of the quality of love taught and exemplified. Wolf speaks of the Old Testament as a record of a "preparatory revelation"—ambiguous to be sure, but revelation nonetheless. This should mean that God himself was present in and active through historical events and persons and that God met man in those encounters. Is not this God as incarnate? Or does Wolf mean that the discontinuity between the Old and New Testaments is not only a difference in the quality, range, and depth of love disclosed but also a difference in substance? Is the presence of God in Christ radically different in substance

from the presence of God in Old Testament personages and events? His interpretation of Christ's resurrection and ascension would seem to presuppose an affirmative answer. If this is so, the discontinuity would seem to be greater than Wolf implies. And other problems arise. If this is not so, questions pertaining to other aspects of his discussion would inevitably ensue.

BERNARD M. LOOMER

. . . and Sin

Hardness of Heart: A Contemporary Interpretation of the Doctrine of Sin, by E. LaB. Cherbonnier; Doubleday & Co., New York; 1955; 188 pp.; \$2.95.

In this book, the fifth in Doubleday's very excellent *Christian Faith Series*, we have been presented with yet another illustration of the apologetic effectiveness of a frankly "functional" interpretation of the Christian message. In pursuing his concern to articulate a biblical "philosophy of life which can sustain itself on independent grounds" (p. 17), Dr. Cherbonnier has been highly successful, not only in indirectly demonstrating the need for some kind of a "demythologization" of the *kerygma*, but also in laying down the major lines along which at least one such interpretation may well proceed. This general apologetic adequacy of his book is further enhanced by an engaging and readable style and by a discriminating employment of many of the relevant insights of contemporary psychological science. Whatever else one may say about this book, he must acknowledge that its basic method of approach is singularly well-adapted to speak to at least the "cultured" among religion's latter-day despisers.

As its well-chosen title indicates, the book has as its principal purpose the formulation of a doctrine of sin which will be adequate both to "biblical wisdom" and the needs of the contemporary world. Its fundamental thesis, clearly, is that such a formulation turns upon a full and consistent appreciation of the fact of human freedom (p. 17). According to Dr. Cherbonnier, man is the uniquely "free" and, therefore, also uniquely "religious" animal. By reason of the fact that he is "constitutionally obliged to make

value judgments," he also necessarily has a "god," i.e., "some criterion of decision independent of himself" (pp. 23, 44). The term "god," in other words, is a "functional word"—a "linguistic reflection of the fact that man is that creature who, in the exercise of his freedom, necessarily appeals to some criterion of good and evil" (p. 40). Thus, the author argues, the important question is not *whether* a man believes in "god," but what (or *who*) his god is (p. 40). By the same token, he maintains, we must not ask *whether* there is such a thing as "sin," but rather *wherein* sin consists. For correlative to every specific answer to the question concerning the identity of "god" will be some specific answer to the question as to the nature of "sin." This is due to the fact that the latter, in its purely "functional" sense, simply means "defection to an alien 'god,'" and, therefore, has some specific value assigned to it, at least implicitly, as soon as something or someone is designated as the *true* "god" (p. 42).

It is in terms of this basic perspective, then, that Dr. Cherbonnier defines the universal human problem as the problem of finding that ultimate allegiance which is really compatible with the fact of man's freedom. It is his conviction and the central argument of the book that only the God of the Bible, whose love frees us from our bondage to false gods and enables us to love our neighbors, can be the object of such an allegiance. "The true God," he writes, "is he whose power to evoke *agapé* binds men together in a redemptive community. Conversely, pseudo gods, instead of fulfilling man's freedom, actually put him in bondage. The unmistakable mark with which they brand their victims is hardness of heart" (p. 57).

The remainder of the book consists in an attempt to "validate" this basic "biblical" view by means of an immanent criticism of its classical and modern alternatives. Dr. Cherbonnier assails not only the familiar idolatries which plague our modern world, but also the perversions of authentic biblical understanding which have resulted from the intrusion of a "pagan" view of man into Christian theology itself. He undertakes to

demonstrate by what amounts to a kind of "transcendental dialectic" that the moralistic view of sin as "the breaking of rules" and the anti-moralistic view which conceives it to be a flaw "intrinsic to human nature" equally fail to appreciate the fact of man's freedom. Thus, he argues that Augustine and Pelagius, for all of their apparent differences, are really "brothers under the skin" and that it is only the biblical understanding of sin which is able to fulfill each of their legitimate intentions without at the same time falling into their respective difficulties. Similarly, he takes the Reformers sharply to task for lapsing into a pagan disparagement of human nature in arguing their case against medieval moralism, and suggests that "the Reformation must continue," at least to the point of disentangling its biblical strands from "the web of pre-Christian ideas in which they are enmeshed" (p. 99).

It is impossible in this brief review to follow the intricacies of Dr. Cherbonnier's argument or to do justice to its many excellences; and yet, perhaps, enough has been said to indicate something of the book's fundamental merit. Regardless of the features one selects for consideration, its basic strengths are obvious.

The unfortunate thing, of course, is that its weaknesses are hardly less so. In general, the latter are the weaknesses of any predominantly polemical work, with the single difference that, in this instance, they seem almost to be compounded by the peculiar limitations under which the author is evidently working. By reason of his basically constructive interest and the need to write primarily for a lay audience, Dr. Cherbonnier is occasionally betrayed into doing even less justice to views other than his own than is usually the case in writings of this type. In one place, for instance, after quoting a passage describing the *via negativa*, he comments that "any similarity between this theology and that of Karl Barth is hardly coincidental" (p. 74). In the absence of documentation and additional comment (save for one sentence in which Barth is alleged to ally himself with a metaphysic that is more neoplatonic than Christian

[p. 86n]), it is difficult to justify such a remark. To the theologian it will seem an impertinence; and the layman may well ask whether it has really been "designed to make the main outlines of the age-old faith meaningful to modern people" (Cf. Dr. Niebuhr's Introduction to the series).

In a similar way, one is prompted to ask whether Dr. Cherbonnier has really done justice to Dr. Tillich's impressive attempt to formulate a theology which is also both "biblical" and "contemporary." In any case, the barrage of question-begging epithets he lays down against the latter (on various occasions it is said to be "mystic," "tragic," and "unbiblical" and in one place is even identified with the "cult of despair") is probably less impressive than his own failure clearly to distinguish his "biblical" view from moralism. It is not without significance, in this reviewer's judgment, that the main portion of his polemic is directed against the view which conceives of sin as "intrinsic to human nature." His facility in speaking of faith *and* works is also disturbing; and one frequently receives the impression that if works are not "works," faith *is*.

Probably the most striking illustration of this general weakness, however, is provided by the author's treatment of Whitehead's celebrated epigram that "religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness" (Cf. p. 53). The entire force of his criticism depends upon considering this remark out of context (Cf., e.g., Whitehead's equally quotable statement that "the topic of religion is individuality in community" [*Religion in the Making* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926), p. 88]), and it is as unfair to Whitehead as it would be for this review to call attention to his own statement that "a man is as the quality of the volitional attitudes which impinge upon him" (p. 136), without also noting the many qualifying things he says about individual freedom and responsibility.

That the principal criticisms which can be made of the book, however, are, on the whole, no more serious than this is but another way of saying that it is a very good book indeed. Although there are some things about it which will disturb the the-

ologian and others which will be tough going for the layman, it is a real challenge to both of them, and we may hope they will rise to meet it. Even more importantly we may hope Dr. Cherbonnier will rise to the challenge he has put to himself in presenting us with such a very promising first book.

SCHUBERT M. OGDEN

Augustine and Contemporary Theology

A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine. ed. by R. W. Battenhouse; Oxford, New York; 1955; 440 pp.; \$5.50.

It is a great pleasure to review a work which both addresses itself to a vital need in theological studies and also succeeds so eminently in fulfilling its purpose. In the contemporary revival of a theology at once orthodox, existential, and intellectually sophisticated, Augustine is, of course, a towering figure. One of the many reasons for this great contemporary relevance of Augustine is certainly that in many respects he lived in our kind of age and dealt with our kind of problems: he too had moved out of "secularism"; he too found in a traditional faith the one answer to deep personal and even deeper social problems; and he too sought to understand with his mind this new religious center of meaning and illumination. In other words he is seemingly the one great historical example of the goal and ideal of contemporary theology, namely the achievement of a rational understanding of all of life from the point of view of faith. Thus Augustine is uniquely the object of present-day theological studies; he is a "must" for every student and lay enquirer. Strangely enough, however, it is also true that this vital study of Augustine is for the student a baffling and frustrating task, for there has been no adequate introduction to his thought, adequate both as to the meaning and scope of his multitudinous ideas and as to the sources in his widely scattered writings for further study of these ideas. *A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine*, consisting of articles by members of the "Duodecim," a society of "younger"

theologians, sets out to fulfill this gaping void in Protestant scholarship; and this reviewer can scarcely imagine a more satisfying answer to this problem.

Perhaps the first crucial ingredient for a successful book on Augustine is that it embody the most helpful arrangement of the great wealth of material involved. Happily in this case the editor has realized that an adequate introduction to Augustinian study should perform at least two diverse tasks: first it should indicate to the student where in the immense Augustinian corpus certain issues are dealt with and how they are there handled; and second it should discuss in systematic form his most important notions. Thus in order that these two tasks be fulfilled with clarity and precision, this book has been divided into two main sections preceded by a shorter introduction which deals initially with Augustine's general significance and then more concretely with his life and times in a truly remarkable short biography.

The first main section is a "critical guide to the major works." Thus, its chapters consist of explanatory and interpretive commentaries on the major bodies of writings that make up the Augustinian corpus: the earliest writings (a beautifully clear discussion from the pen of the late David Roberts), the Anti-Manichean, the Anti-Donatist and the Anti-Pelagian writings, the *De Trinitate*, and finally the *City of God*. The value of these chapters in Part II varies, of course, with the inherent interest of the writings discussed. However, in the total section the reader is given an invaluable commentary on and a unique guide to the contents of almost all of Augustine's many major works; and in the last three chapters he is treated to truly masterly discussions of those basic works in which Augustine expounds his views on sin and grace, on the Trinity and on the philosophy of history.

In the second major section five central problems or issues in Augustinian thought are treated systematically: faith and reason, creation, Christology, ethics, and the devotional life. This reviewer knows of no place where these basic elements of August-

tinianism are more clearly and adequately explained and interpreted. Perhaps it is because this generation feels so akin to Augustine; in any case, with only minor exceptions, Augustine is here viewed as a profound and helpful guide to Christian thinking in each of these areas, and the result is that his basic approach and attitudes are expounded with a clarity and a power which I have not found elsewhere. Most previous Protestants have been offended either by his Catholicism or by his orthodoxy; most Catholics seek to reveal him as an inferior precursor to St. Thomas. Here, however, is a group that can embrace and emphasize his deep synthesis of Biblical orthodoxy and inquiring reason with inner sympathy and therefore with evident enthusiasm—and the result is a most profound and helpful set of interpretations.

My only criticism might concern the extent of this evident "appropriation" of Augustine. Augustine's richness is such that his is not only a synthesis of Biblical orthodoxy and reason; it is also a synthesis of Neoplatonic metaphysics and Catholic religion. Thus, throughout his works certain Neoplatonic categories and "Catholic" ideas (e.g., the notion of infused ontological grace and that of a faith that must be "formed by love" to justify) play an important role; but with only two exceptions, these articles do not seem to give adequate weight to these ideas. In other words, it appears that in order to emphasize the relevance of Augustine's more "Protestant" synthesis of Biblical religion and rational thought, some of these writers may have omitted to emphasize sufficiently those other elements of the full Augustine which were foundational for medieval piety and that thus remain more alien to our present modes of Protestant thinking and experience. But pointing to these shades of emphasis constitutes merely a minor criticism of what is an exceptionally fine piece of cooperative work. If this book is any indication of the literary potentialities of this theological society, let us hope that it is only the first of many such publications.

LANGDON B. GILKEY

The Word of Grace in Christ

The New Being, by Paul Tillich; Scribner's, New York; 1955; 179 pp.; \$2.75.

The appearance of a second book of sermons by Paul Tillich is a joyous event. It is joyous because more than any other living theologian he speaks to an ailing generation sorely in need of a word of grace and healing and provides us with such a word. He communicates with vitality and power to those who are open to the Christian message as well as to those who will not accept it from the church qua church but who nevertheless will lend him a willing ear.

Why does Tillich communicate a word of grace instead of a word of law? Partly because of his own profound and serious questioning which arises from his experience of the powers of anxiety, meaninglessness, and despair. That is to say, he also has felt "the shaking of the foundations." He is therefore in touch to a remarkable degree with what the present generation is experiencing. He asks himself the questions we ask ourselves and for this reason, more than any other, he can speak to us and give an answer.

What is the question? The question is "What can heal us?" The answer is "*the new being as love*." For this and this alone is the message of Christianity—the new being, the new reality, the new creation which is in the Christ. Not a new set of rules, nor another law of bondage, but the freedom of grace. This reality in which we participate from time to time heals us, makes us whole, frees us from self-hate. It is when we experience it that we are filled with love and then God abides in us. For love overcomes the power of evil which disrupts us. And God abiding in us produces love which spills over—the way the oil was spilled over Jesus' feet. It is a love which can be called "holy waste" perfectly committed in the Cross.

The "*new being as freedom*," the theme of the second section of sermons, is not easily won. For it involves the search for the truth, and the acceptance of the truth in the Christ. But this search for the truth is a crucial part of our pilgrimage. It is the truth which alone makes us free. And it

must grasp us in our own experience, or not at all. For "those who have encountered Him who is the truth have one precious thing beyond all others; . . . They look at a life which never lost communion with the divine ground of all life, and they look at a life which never lost the union of love with all beings."

The fruit of love and freedom is *fulfillment*. Self-acceptance and the experience of encountering Him who is the truth produce joy, give us a sense of proportion, namely—we then see things *sub specie aeternitatis*, as did Mary who listened to Jesus talking while Martha busied herself with the work of the household and the transient things of this world. The awareness that love is stronger than death grows from accepting the Christ as the truth which becomes the center of our lives and gives us meaning.

This then is how Tillich answers the question "What can heal us?," as well as the questions implied by it, namely, "How can we face reality?" and "Wherein lies meaning?," namely, by pointing to *the new being* as love, freedom, and fulfillment.

Reading these sermons is a dangerous as well as a joyous experience. There is a seductive quality to them. Because Tillich's approach seems to embrace all questions and answers, the reader is often tempted to assume a passive role in his spiritual life instead of using Tillich's answers as a jumping-off place for further and deeper ques-

tioning. Nothing would displease the author more than so to hypnotize his readers. Yet such a possibility exists and must be guarded against.

Tillich's style is another soothing factor. He continues to communicate exceedingly well by simple construction and many a poetic note. No small amount of praise is due the late Mary Heilner in this respect. She ironed out the Germanic awkwardness, gave the sermons their order, and entitled each section. To her the volume is rightfully dedicated. Here too one might do well to sound a note of warning. Although simply written, the sermons must be read with care, for they always say more than can at first be grasped, and their structure waits to be filled with the content of the reader's own experience.

There is no doubt that this book will be read and re-read for many years to come. Its appearance is timely, coinciding with Tillich's move to the Harvard Divinity School. His departure will leave a great gap in the lives of future Union Seminary students, not to speak of his friends and former students. Yet it is not so much an end for him as it is a beginning in which he himself may well again experience a new community of love, a new atmosphere of freedom, and a new fulfillment. From those years which lie ahead we hope for still another book of sermons.

MARION K. HAUSNER

A Lawyer Looks . . .

(continued from page 13)

we're not supposed to punish men for their ideas, it made me feel we were getting back to the star chamber. It frightened me, because it seemed so contrary to what I always believed was fundamental American fair play . . . I want to do something. I am trying to accomplish the purpose of keeping security from being used for oppression or political purpose."

I believe that the time has come to raise the question as to the place of the liberals in our society urgently and openly. The liberal must be restored in his constitutional rights and given the place which, in the

spirit of the Constitution, he must hold in our democratic society. And, too, the liberal must be protected from unfounded politically inspired accusations of treason, communism, and subversion.

At present the position of the liberal has become particularly difficult not only because he has been placed in a state of general mistrust, but also because every one of his ideas or suggestions for the improvement of conditions in our country is immediately challenged in some political quarters as Communist inspired. In a certain historical situation there are only a limited number of measures for improvement and it is not surprising that men of different philosophies

of life may in practice follow a similar train of thought. The coincidence of detail, however, does not justify the conclusion that similar solutions necessarily presuppose identity of political philosophies.

For example, John Foster Dulles has written at length how the Communists have adopted in their propaganda many basic tenets of the Christian religion. Mr. Dulles' inference was clear that an ardent Christian cannot be called a Communist because some of his social attitudes coincide with some of the views of Communists.

Do we not agree that this unworthy challenge should not be made a test of loyalty? I believe it is alarming that we are presently forced to fight for the right of the liberals to exist and to act in our society. This disturbing trend that we are forced to fight clearly shows that the questions discussed tonight bear directly on our entire future.

It is our tragic lot to live in the shadow of a possible new global war and we know that, if war should come, it is of little importance how we plan to shape our lives.

With the new weapons and their devastating power, civilization will hardly survive. But we all hope that mankind will succeed in avoiding this terrible end. We trust that reason will prevail and that it will be given to us to bequeath to our children the democratic heritage as unimpaired as we have received it from the hands of our fathers. This is a difficult task to fulfill. Only a firm belief in the social values of democracy, only intellectual integrity, thoughtful vigilance, and selfless dedication to serve our fellowmen can help us to prevail.

From an old past, from a different country comes to us an admonition. The scene is Rome. The time—a moment of grave danger to the Roman Republic. The speaker—Marcus Porcius Cato, the statesman and the patriot. At the Roman magistrate he threw his challenge:

"Caveant consules ne quid detrimenti res publica capiat!" . . . "Consuls, beware, lest disaster befall the Republic."

These words are always in my mind. They do not let me rest.

Desegregation

(continued from page 19)

church's total ministry. This is becoming a common mistake among some southern pulpits. It is far wiser to minister to one's members with the impact of the total ministry that the pastorate demands. Two of the most prejudiced people in this writer's acquaintance are faced with no small dilemma as they disagree with his views on the Negro problem. It has so happened that occasions have arisen wherein the minister has been able to serve these two families in very critical situations. To condemn him or punish him for his ethnic views is quite difficult for those people who have been helped by that very minister through some of the rocky trails of their life.

Finally, keep the problem where it belongs. So far as the church is concerned, it belongs within the Christian context. The minister must know all areas of this problem. He should be conversant with its complex fabric. It is nonetheless essential that

his witness and work be of the Christian category. This situation is not going to be solved on any other basis. There is little reason for trying. Certainly, the minister is rather stupid to attempt any other way. His witness needs to be made articulate in deed as well as word. There must be in him a love and understanding for all men which fits him to associate with them in numerous situations. All too many crusaders in the South right now, who pound the pulpit concerning our treatment of the Negro, are very ill at ease in their social company. There is no better strategy than the challenge of the Christian faith undergirded by the prophetic action of those who preach it.

This writer is tempted to hope that the above words could be called prophetic. Yet, he knows that if he is a prophet at all, he belongs to the company of frightened prophets. The South faces some perilous and uncertain times. Only a fool views it without trepidation. Yet many of us are glad to be in the South at this time in history. There is much room for a Christian witness.

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